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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:
Case No.

Plaintiff/Petitioner, :
v.

:

FRANK EDWARD PHARRIS,

:

Category No. 13

Defendant/Respondent. :
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The sole question presented for review is whether the
court of appeals erroneously held that State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d
1309 (Utah 1987), adopted a "strict compliance" test with rule
11(5), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which supersedes the
"record as a whole" test traditionally applied on review to
determine whether a guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily
entered.
OPINION BELOW
The court of appeals' opinion was issued on September
14, 1990, and appears in State v. Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 35
(Utah Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1990) (a copy of the court's opinion is
contained in the addendum).
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition
under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with retail theft, a third degree
felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602(1) (Supp. 1989).

On the

day of trial, defendant pled guilty as charged and was sentenced
immediately thereafter by Judge Richard H. Moffat to serve a term
of zero to five (0-5) years in the Utah State Prison.
Directly after sentence was imposed, defendant moved to
withdraw his guilty plea and requested that he proceed to trial.
Defendant's attorney stated that unless his client received some
sort of concession for pleading guilty as charged, it was a
disservice to his client to not go to trial.

Judge Moffat

granted defendant's motion and set trial for the next day.
The following day, Judge Moffat reconsidered
defendant's motion and found that defendant's disappointment with
his sentence was not "good cause" to allow defendant to renege on
his guilty plea (T. 19). Defendant's sentence as previously
imposed was allowed to stand (T. 19-20).

On appeal, the court of

appeals reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion
to withdraw his guilty plea and remanded the case to allow
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.

Pharris, 143 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 38.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A recitation of the facts of defendant's crimes is not
necessary for purposes of this petition.

The relevant facts are

those stated above in the Statement of the Case.
The facts underlying the charges against defendant are
accurately summarized in the court of appeals' opinion. Pharris,
143 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35.

ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT
STATE V, GIBBONS, 740 P.2D 1309 (UTAH 1987),
ADOPTED A TEST OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH RULE
11(5), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
WHICH SUPERSEDES THE "RECORD AS A WHOLE" TEST
TRADITIONALLY APPLIED ON REVIEW TO DETERMINE
WHETHER A GUILTY PLEA WAS KNOWINGLY AND
VOLUNTARILY ENTERED.
On appeal to the court of appeals, defendant argued,
inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because "the trial court
failed to inform him of (1) his right against self incrimination;
(2) the nature and elements of the offense; and (3) the possible
penalties which might be imposed."
Adv. Rep. at 35.

State v. Pharris, 143 Utah

The State responded that, under the "record as

a whole" test traditionally applied by this Court in reviewing
the voluntariness of a guilty plea, see, e.g., Jolivet v. Cook,
784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 751 (1990);
State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988); State v. Miller,
718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), the trial court had
2
not abused its discretion.
In reversing and remanding to allow defendant to
withdraw his guilty plea, the court of appeals definitively
rejected the State's argument that the "record as a whole" test

The "record as a whole" test was stated in Miller as follows:
[T]he absence of a finding under [rule 11] is
not critical so long as the record as a whole
affirmatively establishes that the defendant
entered his plea with full knowledge and
understanding of its consequences and of the
rights he was waiving.
718 P.2d at 405.
-3-

applied, concluding that in State v. Gibbons, this Court
"announced that strict compliance was required under Rule 11(5)
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure when defendant's entered
guilty pleas".

Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36.

In sum, the

court of appeals ruled that if the trial court has not strictly
complied with rule 11(5), the guilty plea, although perhaps
otherwise voluntary, must automatically be vacated.

This

conclusion misconstrues Gibbons and ignores significant language
in both pre-Gibbons and post-Gibbons opinions of this Court that
clearly cuts against the notion that Gibbons abandoned the record
as a whole test for determining the voluntariness, and thus
3
validity, of a guilty plea.
In Gibbons, this Court did not review either the trial
court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea or the
voluntariness of the defendant's guilty pleas.

Rather, the

Court, in the context of remanding the case because an attack on
the voluntariness of a guilty plea must first be presented to the
trial court in the form of a motion to withdraw, concluded that
"a statement of the law concerning the taking of guilty pleas in
all trial courts in this state is appropriate."
P. 2d at 1312.

Gibbons, 740

It then set out the specific requirements for

taking of guilty pleas under rule 11 for the purpose of assisting
the trial court on remand in determining the validity of the
defendant's pleas.

Ibid.

The Gibbons Court did not even mention

the record as a whole test for determining voluntariness of a
The State has also petitioned this Court for review on
identical grounds in State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Ct.
App. August 24, 1990).

guilty plea, and the reason seems obvious:

the Court was not

reviewing the trial court record to determine the voluntariness
of the defendant's pleas.

Thus, the court of appeals' conclusion

that Gibbons replaced the record as a whole test with a strict
compliance test reads far too much into Gibbons.

The Gibbons

Court simply did not address that issue.
Furthermore, certain language in several post-Gibbons
opinions of this Court strongly suggests that the record as a
whole test was not modified by Gibbons.

For example, in Jolivet

v. Cook/ this Court stated:
We first address Jolivet's claim that his
guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary.
Specifically, Jolivet argues that Judge Burns
erred in the taking of his guilty pleas
because he did not make findings that Jolivet
understood the elements of each crime charged
ar.d how those elements related ~c the facts,
as required by State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d
1309 (Utah 1987), or that Jolivet knew the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive
sentences. In fact, Jolivet claims that he
did not know or understand these things when
he entered his pleas.
[Rule 11(5) (d)] requires that- before a
trial court accepts a guilty plea, it must
find that the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to which
he or she is entering the plea. In Gibbons,
this Court stated that in making this
finding, the trial court must ensure that the
defendant understands "the elements of the
crimes charged and the relationship of the
law to the facts." Id. at 1312. In
addition, [rule 11(5)(e)] requires that
before the trial court accepts a guilty plea,
it must find that the defendant knows of the
possibility of- the imposition of consecutive
sentences. The record clearly shows that at
the time the guilty pleas were accepted,
Judge Burns did not make the findings
required by [rule 11(5)], i.e., that Jolivet
understood the elements of each crime charged
and how these elements related to the facts
-5-

and that Jolivet knew the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences.
However, this Court has held, M[T]he absence
of a finding under [rule 11] is not critical
so long as the record as a whole
affirmatively establishes that the defendant
entered his plea with full knowledge and
understanding of its consequences and of the
rights he was waiving." State v. Miller, 718
P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986); Brooks v. Morris,
709 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1985); Warner v.
Morris, 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985).
784 P.2d at 1149-50 (footnotes omitted).

And in State v.

Copeland, the Court, without citing Gibbons, said:
The United States Supreme Court has said,
"[T]here is no adequate substitute for
demonstrating in the record at the time the
plea is entered the defendant's understanding
of the nature of the charge against him.M
McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 470, 89 S.Ct. at 1173
(emphasis in the original). We think the
most effective way to do this is to have the
defendant state in his own words his
understanding of the offense and the action
which make him guilty of the offense. By
this statement, the trial court can assure
itself that the defendant is truly submitting
a voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover, the
record on appeal will clearly reflect the
defendant's understanding. Although this
method is therefore preferable to others, it
is not absolutely required. ThQ test is
voluntariness. We hold that the record
demonstrates that defendant admitted acts
sufficient to justify his conviction of the
offense to which he pleaded guilty.
765 P.2d at 1273 (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
Although both Jolivet and Copeland involved pre-Gibbons
guilty pleas, Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37, this Court did
not note or attach any significance to that fact in either
opinion, and, in fact, directly applied Gibbons in Jolivet in
concluding that although the trial court did not strictly comply
with rule 11, the record as a whole demonstrated that Jolivet

-6-

entered his guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily.
P.2d at 1149-51.

Jolivet, 784

This seriously undermines the court of appeals'

effort to distinguish Jolivet and Copeland on the basis that the
record as a whole test was applied in those cases because they
4
involved pre-Gibbons guilty pleas.
Significantly, in State v.
Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989), which involved a post-Gibbons
guilty plea, this Court appeared to apply the record as a whole
test in reversing the trial court's denial of the defendant's
5
motion to withdraw.
Finally, that the record as a whole test represents the
most reasonable standard upon which to assess a post-conviction
attack on the voluntariness of a guilty plea is made clear in the
following passage from State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986):
A final word on the Scate's Rule 11
arguments. In its zeal to set aside Kay's
guilty pleas or renege on the bargain that
was struck, the State has argued, in effect,
that otherwise voluntary and lawful guilty
pleas should always be voided when the trial
court violates any provision of Rule 11. The
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Hall and
Justice Howe adopt this reasoning as well.
This position was shortsighted, for to follow
it would be to sanction a remedy far worse
than the wrong. If we were to hold any

It is not clear what significance State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d
670 (Utah 1989) (per curiam), which was issued five days before
Jolivet, has in this inquiry. Unlike Jolivet, Hickman declined
to apply Gibbons to a pre-Gibbons guilty plea on the ground that
Gibbons represented a clear break from the past and would
therefore not be applied retroactively. Hickman, 779 P.2d at 672
n.l. Insofar as Hickman might be read to support the court of
appeals' strict compliance test, it is inconsistent with Jolivet
and should not be followed.
5
The court of appeals obviously disagrees with this reading of
Smith, having stated directly in the instant case that Smith
applied the "strict compliance test articulated in Gibbons."
Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. at 38 n.6.
-7-

violation of Rule 11 automatically voids the
resultant plea, even when the plea is
knowingly and voluntarily entered, we would
encourage defendant's, convicted and
sentenced after such a plea, to attack their
convictions for purely tactical reasons,
either by direct appeal or by seeking habeas
corpus long after the fact. We have refused
to overturn convictions upon such challenges
in the past, e.g., State v. Knowles, Utah,
709 P.2d 311 (1985); State v. Morris, Utah,
709 P.2d 310 (1985), [sic] and we find no
reason to encourage such attacks in the
future.
Overturning such convictions—which we
would have to do if we embraced the rationale
advanced by the State and the Chief Justice's
concurring opinion—would require the State
to reprosecute numerous defendants, probably
long after the challenged guilty pleas were
entered and when the passage of time would
make reprosecution impractical, if not
impossible. Almost certainly, the ultimate
result would be to free a number of convicted
persons for nothing more than technical
errors in the acceptance of their voluntary
guilty pleas.
717 : 2d at 1301-02 (footnote omitted) . This view is consistent
with the harmless error rule long recognized by this Court in a
variety of contexts.

See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 1071

(Utah 1989) (harmless error standard for nonconstitutional
error); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 n.8 (Utah 1989) ("with
Most jurisdictions apply a record as a whole test rather than
the strict compliance rule adopted by the court of appeals. See,
e.g., United States v. Barry, 895 F.2d 702 (10th Cir.~1990)
(district court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11 does
not warrant reversal where defendant's knowledge of rights waived
was otherwise apparent); Wood v. State, 190 Ga.App, 179, 378
S.E.2d 520 (Ga. App. 1989.) (where defendant was otherwise
informed of rights waived, harmless error standard is applied to
trial court's failure to comply with rule governing taking of
pleas); People v. Bettistea, 181 Mich.App. 194, 448 N.W.2d 781,
783 (Mich. App. 1989) ("record as a whole" demonstrated that plea
was made knowingly and voluntarily); People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d
9, 459 N.E.2d 170 (N.Y. 1983) (voluntariness of plea determined
by considering all relevent circumstances surrounding it, not by
judge's ritualistic recitation of rights waived).

respect to certain constitutional errors, we must place on the
State the burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt").

See also Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a); Utah R.

Evid. 103(a); Utah R. Civ. P. 61.

Interestingly, the court of

appeals did not so much as mention Kay, even though the State
cited the foregoing quoted language from Kay to it in its brief.
See State v. Pharris, Case No. 890549-CA, Br. of Appellee at 10.
In sum, a careful reading of Gibbons and this Court's
pre-and post-Gibbons decisions indicates that the court of
appeals erred in holding that Gibbons replaced the record as a
whole test with a strict compliance test.

A strict compliance

test is not required either by Gibbons or logic.
Accordingly, this Court should grant certiorari because
the court of appeals has rendered a decision on a question of law
which is in conflict with decisions of this Court.
P. 46(b).

Utah R. App.

Insofar as the issue of what standard applies on

review of the voluntariness of a guilty plea is unsettled in
light of Gibbons, certiorari should be granted because the court
of appeals has decided an important question of law which should
be settled by this Court.

Utah R. App. P. 46(d).
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing arguments, the State's petition
for certiorari should be granted pursuant to rule 46(b) or (d),
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this

cfayof October, 1990.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

_q_

DAN R. LARSEN

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Petition were mailed, postage prepaid, to James A.
Valdez and Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 424
East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, t h i s / 3 - —
day of October, 1990.
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IN THL
U T A H COURT OF APPEALS
STATF of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Frank Edward PHARRIS,
Defendant and Appellant
No. S90549-CA
FILED- September 14, 1990
Third District, Salt Lake Countv
The Honorable Richard H Moffat
ATTORNEY S
James A Valdez and Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt
Lake Cit>, for Appellant
R Paul Van Dam and Dan R Larsen, Salt
Lake Cit\, for Appellee
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Newev '
BILLINGS, Judge.
Defendant Frank Edward Pharns appeals
his conviction of retail theft, a third degree
felon\, in violation of Utah Code Ann §76
6-602(1) (1989) We vacate the conviction
and remand
Defendant was accused of taking a VCR
from a Sears store without paving for it
Police arrested defendant in the store parking
lot with the VCR in his possession
Defendant's trial was set for August 8,
1989 On the da> of trial, defendant agreed to
enter a guilty plea if the State would not
oppose a motion that defendant be sentenced
pursuant to Utah Code Ann
§76-6412(1 )(c) (1989), for a class A misdemeanor
At the change of plea hearing, the trial
judge asked defendant whether he had gone
over his statement with his attorney, whether
he was under the influence of drugs or
alcohol, whether he understood the English
language, whether he was threatened or pro
mised anything other than the plea bargain
itself, and whether he was acting freely and of
his own volition
The judge then told defendant he was entitled to certain constitutional protections including the right to trial by a jury, the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, the
nght to require the State to prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt, and "other valuable constitutional rights " Defendant said he
understood his waiver of those rights by pleading guilty and was willing to do so
The judge asked defendant if he had any
questions of the court or of his attorney
Defendant responded, "No" The judge asked
if defendant knew the allowable penalties for a

third degree felony and whether his attorney
had discussed those penalties with him Defe
ndant answered, "Yes " The judge told defe
ndant the court was not bound by the reco
mmendations of the plea bargain and the
court could impose anv sentence either cone
urrently or consecutively with the sentence
defendant was presently serving
Defendant entered a plea of guiltv which the
judge declared was entered voluntanlv and
knowingly Defendant waived the two-dav
minimum time for sentencing and asked to be
sentenced immediately Defense counsel asked
the court to impose sentence as a class A
misdemeanor The prosecutor did not oppose
defense counsel's request but described defe
ndant's extensive criminal record The judge
denied defendant's motion to reduce the
offense one degree and sentenced defendant to
serve zero to five years concurrently with the
sentence he was presently serving
Defendant immediately moved to withdraw
his guilty plea and asked to proceed to trial
Defense counsel argued that unless his client
received some concession in the sentence, it
would be a disservice to him not to go to trial
The judge granted the motion and set trial for
the next day
The next morning, the judge reversed his
decision granting the motion to withdraw the
guilty plea, explaining that a showing of
"good cause" was required The judge then
gave defendant an opportunity to show good
cause as to whv his plea should be withdrawn
In response, defense counsel explained the
State had not opposed the reduction of defe
ndant's sentenLe to a class A misdemeanor
He pointed to the length of time defendant
had been incarcerated since his arrest and the
circumstances surrounding defendant's release
on another conviction and his subsequent
arrest Defense counsel also mentioned that he
had ineffectively represented defendant by
indicating that the plea bargain had a good
chance of success In response, the prosecutor
again outlined portions of defendant's prior
criminal record
The judge noted he had informed defendant
before the guilty plea was entered that the
recommendations as to the sentence were not
binding on the court and defendant's disap
pomtment with the sentence did not establish
good cause for withdrawal of the plea The
judge ultimately reimposed the sentence
Among other claims on appeal,2 defendant
asserts the trial judge failed to comply with
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure as required by the Utah Supreme Court
in State v Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah
1987), when accepting his guilty plea Defendant contends the trial court failed to inform
him of (1) his right against selfincrimination, (2) the nature and elements of
the offense, and (3) the possible penalties
which might be imposed The State on appeal

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

Stater. Phanis

CODE^CO
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(b) the plea is voluntarily made;
(c) the defendant knows he has
rights against compulsory selfincrimination, to a jury trial, and to
confront and cross-examine in
open court the witnesses against
him, and that by entering the plea
he waives all of those rights;
(d) the defendant understands the
nature and dements of the offense
to which he is entering the plea;
that upon trial the prosecution
would have the burden of proving
each of those elements beyond a
reasonable doubt; and that the plea
CONSIDERING VOLUNTARINESS OF
is an admission of all those elemGUILTY PLEA FOR FIRST TIME ON
ents;
APPEAL
(e) the defendant knows the
Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah
minimum and maximum sentence
Court of Appeals have allowed a Rule 11
that may be imposed upon him for
challenge to the voluntariness of a plea to be
each offense to which a plea is
considered for the first time on appeal. *[IJn
entered, including the possibility of
certain cases we may consider the failure to
the imposition of consecutive sentcomply with Rule 11(5) and Gibbons as error
ences;
sufficiently manifest and fundamental to be
first raised on appeal to this court." Stste v. UtahR.Crim. P. 11(5).
Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. Prior to 1987, the Utah Supreme Court did
1989) (per curiam).3 See also State v. Gibbons, not require strict compliance with Rule 11.
740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987) (defendant The court had concluded that a guilty plea
had not moved to withdraw guilty plea and may be upheld if "the record as a whole afficourt remanded to the trial court to allow a rmatively establishes that defendant entered
withdrawal motion while retaining jurisdiction his plea with full knowledge and understanding of its consequences/ Warner v. Morris,
over the case).
The Valencia court relied on the United 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985) (mem.); see also
States Supreme Court decision in Boykin v. Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310, 311
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), where the (Utah 1985) (per curiam). This "record as a
Court found no error when the Alabama whole" test was later reaffirmed in Srare v.
Supreme Court, on its own motion, dealt with Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per
the constitutionality of a guilty plea. Id. at curiam).
In 1987, the Utah Supreme Court rejected
240. The Court stated that "[ijt was error,
the
"record as a whole" test. In State v.
plain on the face of the record, for the trial
judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the Utah
an affirmative showing that it was intelligent Supreme Court announced that strict compliance was required under Rule 11(5) of the
and voluntary. Id. at 242.4
Although we acknowledge that the trial Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure when defjudge made a greater effort to ensure that endants entered guilty pleas. Id. at 1314. In Gibdefendant's plea was voluntarily and knowi- bons, the trial judge, in accepting
ngly given than in Valencia and Boykin, Gibbons' guilty plea, informed him of the
because of the fundamental rights involved, penalties for the crimes, the constitutional
we conclude the trial court's deficiencies in rights he waived as articulated in Rule 11, the
determining whether the guilty plea was possible sentences for the crimes, and the
entered knowingly and voluntarily constitute possibility that those sentences could run
plain error.5 We therefore will address this concurrently or consecutively. Id. at 1311.
However, the trial judge failed to inform
issue for the first time on appeal.
Gibbons of the elements of the crimes. Id. The
RULE 11
Utah Supreme Court remanded Gibbon's
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal appeal of his guilty plea because he had not
Procedure sets out findings a court must make filed a motion to withdraw his plea, thereby
before accepting a guilty plea. Rule 11(5) I depriving the trial court of the opportunity to
provides, in pertinent part:
I address the error, but articulated its concern
that the plea was not properly taken as defeThe court may refuse to accept a
ndant had not been adequately informed of
plea of guilty or no contest, and
I the elements of the offense to which he pled. Id.
may not accept the plea until the
at 1311.
court has found:
I The Utah Supreme Court in Gibbons took
does not contend the trial court's questioning
of defendant complies with the Gibbons strict
compliance lest, but rather responds that
appellate court decisions subsequent to Gibbons
have abandoned the strict compliance
standard and allow application of the prior
'record as a whole" test to determine whether
defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered
his guilty plea. The State further asserts that,
At the hearing before the trial judge, defendant
did not articulate as a ground for withdrawal
of his plea that the court failed to comply with
Rule 11 and thus defendant cannot raise this
issue for the first time on appeal.
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ike opportunity to articulate the requirements applied the previous 'record as a whole" test.
for accepting guilty pleas. The court noted the Recently in State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv.
trial court's burden to comply with the Rule Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), we clearly held
11 requirements:
that the Gibbons ttrict compliance test is
controlling. Id. at 28.
Because of the importance of
Other opinions have likewise stated the test
compliance with Rule 11(e) (new
for
determining whether Rule 11 has been
Rule 11(5)] and Boykin, UJC law
followed is the strict compliance test articulplaces the burden of establishing
ated in Gibbons. See State v. Smith, 777 P.2d
compliance with those requirements
464, 465 (Utah 1989)*; State v. Valencia, 776
on the trial judge. It is not sufficP.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (per
ient to assume that defense attorcuriam)7.
neys make sure that their clients
The State relies on Johvet v. Cook, 784
fully understand the contents of the
P.2d 1148, 1149 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110
affidavit.
S. Ct. 751 (1990),« and Stare v. Copeland, 765
The use of a sufficient affidavit
P.2d 1266, 1273 (Utah 1988),* to support its
can promote efficiency, but an
argument that the Utah Supreme Court has
affidavit should be only a starting
retrenched to the "record as a whole" test.
point, not an end point, in the
However, we assume that the court applied the
pleading process.
"record as a whole" test in these cases because
Jd. at 1313.
the
guilty pleas in both cases were entered
The court found that a "sufficient affidavit"
should contain the following elements: (1) a before the Gibbons decision.*
The State also argues that this court has
list of the names and the degrees of the crimes
charged; (2) a statement of the elements of the retrenched to the "record as a whole" test as
offenses; (3) a synopsis of the defendant's acts well in Stare v. Thursron, 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah
that establish the elements of the crimes Ct. App. 1989). However, Thurston is not on
charged; (4) the allowable punishment for the point and the State is mistaken in its reliance
crimes charged and note the possibility of on this case. In Thurston, the defendant
consecutive sentences for multiple crimes; (5) argued the State had not kept its part of the
the rights waived by the entry of a guilty plea; plea agreement as to the recommendation that
(6) the details of any plea bargain with a dis- defendant receive probation and thus defenclaimer that any sentencing recommendations dant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty
may not be followed; (7) the defendant's plea because of this failure. Id. at 1301. The
ability to read and understand the English issue was not whether the trial court failed to
language; (8) the defendant's competency; and comply with Rule 11 in determining whether
(9) the absence of any inducements to influ- the plea was knowing and voluntary. As the
ence defendant's plea. Id. at 1313-14. The court explained:
The record here establishes that
court concluded that *[t]he trial judge should
defendant .was fully informed of his
then review the statements in the affidavit with
rights and the consequences of his
the defendant, question the defendant conceguilty plea.
rning his understanding of it, and fulfill the
The judge, pursuant to Rule 11,
other requirements imposed by [Rule 11] on
informed defendant of his rights to
the record before accepting the guilty plea." Id.
t r i a l a n d a g a i n s t s e1f at !314 (emphasis added).
incrimination, and related to him
The Gibbons standard was acknowledged by
the potential consequences of his
this court in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d
guilty plea.
92 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, denied, 765
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988), where we reiterated Id. at 1302.
In summary, we find the Gibbons strict
the rule that:
compliance test is applicable to this post[t]rial courts may not rely on
Gibbons guilty plea. In reviewing the trial
defense counsel or executed affidcourt's
inquiry into the voluntariness of defavits to satisfy the specific requireendant's plea, we find the trial judge did not
ments of Rule 11(e). [Gibbons, 740
review with the defendant in court on the
P.2d] at 1313. Rather,. with or
record three of the requirements of Rule 11.
without an affidavit or defense
First, the trial court did not as required by
counsel's advice, the trial court
Rule ll(5Xc) inform defendant at the time the
must conduct an on-the-record
plea was taken that he waived his constitutireview with defendant of the Rule
onal
right against self-incrimination by ple11(e) requirements.
Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at 94 (quoting Gib- ading guilty to the offense. The State argues
bons, 740 P.2d at 1314)). However, in that this information is included in the affidVasilacopulos, the defendant's guilty plea was avit. However, inclusion in the affidavit alone
entered prior to Gibbons and thus the court is not sufficient to ensure that the defendant's
constitutional rights are protected. See
UTAH ADVAN<
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Next, the trial court made ao inquiry on the
ptcord concerning defendant's understanding
of the nature and elements of the offense as
required by Rule M(5Xd). The State «rfues
that the nature and elements of the offense of
retail theft were explained at defendant's
preliminary hearing. However, the preliminary
hearing transcript is not before us and thus it
is impoctible for us to make this determination. Again, this information is only in the
affidavit and, as we have explained, that alone
k insufficient. Failure to inform a defendant
of the nature and elements of the offense is
fatal to a guilty plea conviction. See Gibbons,
740 PJ2d at 1314." See also Valencia, 776
P.2d 1332,1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Finally, the trial court failed to review the
possible punishment with defendant as required by Rule ll(5Xe). The record reflects the
following dialogue between the defendant and
the trial court on the issue of penalties:
Q [THE COURTJ: Are you aware of the
possible penalties that can be imposed for a
Third Degree Felony? Has your attorney told
you what the possible penalties are?
A [DEFENDANT): Yes.
Utah courts have found the failure to
inform a defendant of the punishments possible is fatal to a guilty plea conviction.12 See
Smith, 777 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989) (court
reversed because record did not show defendant was informed of the minimum mandatory sentence which would be imposed); Vasilicopulos, 756 P.2d at 95 (in a pre-Gibbons
plea, the court reversed after finding the defendant did not understand the possibility of
consecutive sentences).13
Under the Gibbons strict compliance test,
before accepting the guilty plea, the trial court
must review on the record with the defendant
at the time the plea is taken the nature and
elements of the offense, the constitutional
rights articulated in Rule 11 which he waives
by pleading guilty, and the allowable penalties.
We find that the trial court failed to strictly
comply with Rule 11 and Gibbons and thus we
vacate defendant's conviction and remand to
the trial court to allow defendant to withdraw
his guilty plea.
Judith M. Billings, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
Robert L. Newey, Judge
1. Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile Court Judge,
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-3-24(10) (1990).
2. Defendant also claims that (1) the prosecutor
failed to comply with the plea agreement; (2) the
court erred in reversing its prior order granting
withdrawal of the plea; (3) there was 'good cause'
to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea; and
(4) defendant's sentence was based on material
misinformation. Because we reverse on defendant's
U T A H AIWA
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Rule 11 claim, we do not reach the other issues
presented on appeal.
3. In Vmkocia, the defendant was asked two questions at the time the guilty plea was entered: (1)
whether defendant "understood his affidavit;' and
(2) whether his plea was "voluntary." Valencia, 776
P.2d at 1334. The court found that the guilty plea
was not entered in compliance with Rule 11(5) or
with Gibbons and summarily reverted and remanded
to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and
proceed to trial. Vaiencta, 776 P.2d at 1334.
4. In Boykin, there was no dialogue in the record
between the defendant and the trial judge as to the
voluntariness of the guilty plea, Boykin, 395 U.S. at
239, and the United States Supreme Court therefore
concluded that the defendant's constitutional rights
had been violated, id. at 243.
5. The Utah Supreme Court has enunciated a twopart test for determining plain error. State v. Eldredge, 773 P J d 29, 35 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110
5. Ct. 62 (1989). First, the error must be "plain,'
which means "from our examination of the record,
we must be able to say that it should have been
obvious to the trial court that it was committing
error." Id. at 35. Second, the error "must affect the
substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that the error
be harmful." Id. See Also State v. Braun, 787 P.2d
1336, 1341 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
The defendant's guilty plea in this case was
entered after the Gibbons case was decided. Therefore, it should have been obvious to the thai judge
that strict compliance with Rule 11 was required. In
addition, defendant's substantial constitutional
rights were affected by this failure to strictly comply
with Rule 11.
6. In Smith, the Utah Supreme Court allowed the
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea because the trial
judge did not strictly comply with Rule 11. Smith,
111 P.2d at 465. The court ruled that the test for
complying with Rule 11 is the strict compliance test
articulated in Gibbons. Id. The court then found
that neither the plea bargain affidavit nor the trial
judge clearly communicated that defendant would
be required to serve a minimum mandatory sentence
of five years. Id.
7. In Valencia, the defendant entered his guilty plea
after the Gibbons decision. The trial judge failed to
review the contents of the affidavit with the defendant. Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1335. The court concluded that the affidavit alone could not 'serve as a
mere substitute for the full and complete review on
the record by the trial court that is required by the
rule." Id. Since the trial judge failed to comply with
Rule 11, the court remanded to the trial court to
allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Id.
8. In Jolivet, the Utah Supreme Court applied the
"record as a whole" test to Jolivet *s mouon to withdraw a guilty plea. Jolivet, 784 P.2d at 1149.
While the court does not give the date Jolivet
entered his guilty plea or address the fact that the
guilty plea had been entered prior to Gibbons, the
Jolivet decision was the second appeal by the defendant, who had entered his guilty plea prior to the
first appeal decided in 1986, before the decision in
Gibbons. See State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843 (Utah
1986).
9. In Copeland, the defendant argued that the trial
court failed to explain the nature and elements of
the offense. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1273. The court
examined the record and found that the trial court
had adequately explained the elements of the crime
to the defendant. Id. Although the trial court did
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not ate Hie preferred method of having the
Ote as
'defendant state m his own words his understanding
143 Utah Adv. Re*. 39
of the offense and the actions which make him
guilty of the crime/ id., the court found that the
IN THE
dements of the offense were clearly explained to
defendant at the time of his arraignment and, therUTAH COURT OF APPEALS
efore, under the 'record as a whole* test, the plea
was voluntary. Id. Once again, however, Oopeland
Mary J. BAILEY (Adams),
entered his guilty plea before Gibbons was decided
Plaintiff aad Appellant,
and although the court did not articulate this as a
v.
reason for applying the 'record as a whole' test, we
Spencer ADAMS,
assume this to be the case.
Defeaoaat aad Appellee.
If. Utah courts have refused to apply the Gibbons
strict compliance test to pre-Gibbons guilty pleas.
In Sute v. Vastiacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct.
No. M0344-CA
App. 19S8), this court ruled that the Gibbons test
FILED: September 19, 1 * 0
did not apply since Vasilacopulos entered his guilty
plea in 1984 before the Gibbons case was decided. Id. Third District, Salt Lake County
at 94. The court ruled that since the Gibbons
The Honorable Raymond S. Uno
test was a 'dear break with the past,' it would not
be applied retroactively. Id. See Mho Suite v.
ATTORNEYS:
Hickman, 779 PJd 670, 672 n.l (Utah 1989) (per Suzanne Mareiius, Salt Lake City, for
curiam).
Appellant
11. The Gibbons court relied on McCarthy v.
Nicolaas de Jonge, Salt Lake City, for
United StMtcs, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), where the
United States Supreme Court stated that the factual
Appellee
elements of the charges must be explained so the
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and
defendant understand* those dements. Id. at 466.
Davidson1 (On Law and Motion).
The Court concluded that "(tlhere is no adequate
substitute for demonstrating in the record at the
time the plea is entered the defendant's understanPER CURIAM:
ding of the nature of the charge against him." Id.
This matter is before the court on appel12. The State argues the affidavit is sufficient to
lant's
motion for summary reversal for manapprise defendant of the allowable sentence.
ifest error, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 10.
However, the affidavit signed by the defendant
In response, appellee filed a motion to dismiss
listed 'Theft, 3rd Degree, 0-5' under the notation
plaintiffs motion for summary disposition,
of 'Crime, Degree, and Punishment," but the affidavit did not include the term 'years' following '0but did not file a response addressing the
5.'
merits of appellant's motion.
13. The Gibbons court stated that a judge may not
We first consider appellee's motion to
use an affidavit to establish compliance with Rule
dismiss appellant's motion. Appellee contends
11:
that the motion was untimely based on Rule
It is not sufficient to assume that
10's requirement that a motion for summary
defense attorneys make sure that their
disposition be filed within 10 days after the
clients fully understand the contents of
docketing statement is served. Appellant's
the affidavit.
docketing statement was served on July 9,
The use of a sufficient affidavit can
1990, and her motion for summary disposition
promote efficiency, but an affidavit
was filed on July 23, 1990. Appellant contends
should be only a starting point, not an
that because she served the docketing stateend point, in the pleading process.
ment by mail, she was entitled to an additional
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313.
three days after service of the docketing statThe Utah Supreme Court's most recent opinion
on this Gibbons issue is somewhat ambiguous. In
ement in which to file a motion for summary
State v. Smith, 111 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989), the court
reversal. See Utah R. App. P. 22(d). Although
found that neither the affidavit nor the trial court
this three-day mailing rule is usually applied
clearly explained the possibility of a minimum
when the receiving party is required or permmandatory sentence to the defendant. Id. at 465.
itted to act after receipt of the document, it
The court concluded: "In order for defendant's
does not specifically exclude the present situguilty plea to be valid and in compliance with rule
1 1(e)(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure ation. It is unnecessary to rely upon the
mailing rule, however, since Utah R. App. P.
and Stare v. Gibbons, the record must show that he
2 provides this court with the flexibility to
was unequivocably and dearly informed about the
suspend the requirements of Rule 10, on its
sentence that would be imposed. Such evidence does
not exist either in the affidavit regarding the plea
own motion, where asuspension is "(i]n the
bargain or in the transcript of the guilty plea. Thus,
interest of expediting a decision." Because we
rule 11(e) and State v. Gibbons require the vacating
conclude that the motion is clearly meritorious
of defendant's guilty plea on the ground that it was
and would thus support a suspension of Rule
not knowingly and voluntarily made.' Id. at 466
10's time limitation, we deny the motion to
(emphasis added).
dismiss appellant's motion.
The parties were divorced in 1985. AppelUTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

